

Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 439

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BANGKOK 6426

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SNAR, TH, BM

SUBJ: NARCOTICS CONTROL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE NEXT STEPS -
PART II

REF: STATE 064271 B) RANGOON 0544

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS A SERIES OF PROPOSALS FOR ACTION WHICH I
MOST EARNESTLY PRESENT FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION, WITH REGARD
TO NARCOTICS CONTROL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEY DEAL WITH WAYS
TO LIMIT PRODUCTION AND TO INCREASE THE SEIZURE OF OPIATES
IN THIS REGION. END SUMMARY.

1. IN AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF NARCOTICS ON THE UNITED
STATES DELIVERED APRIL 9, 1976, PRESIDENT FORD ESTIMATED THE
TOTAL COST OF DRUG ABUSE AT \$17 BILLION ANNUALLY AND THE YEARLY
COST OF DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND REHABILITATION AT
\$421 MILLION. HOWEVER, THE ANNUAL APPROPRIATION FOR OUR
EFFORTS IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL NARCOTICS FIELD HAS BEEN LESS THAN
\$40 MILLION ANNUALLY. WASHINGTON IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO
JUDGE WHAT CAN BE OBTAINED IN APPROPRIATIONS FOR OUR VARIOUS
EFFORTS, BUT I FIND THE ABOVE DISPROPORTION BETWEEN THE COSTS OF
DRUG ABUSE AND OUR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN THIS AREA TO
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BE DISTURBING. THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM IS ESSENTIALLY DOMES-
TIC, BUT OUR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS ARE ASTONISHINGLY SMALL
IN COMPARISON WITH THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM.

2. I MENTION THIS BECAUSE THE POSSIBLE AREAS OF ACTIVITY
WHICH I AM SETTING FORTH BELOW WILL CERTAINLY COST A LOT OF
MONEY. WE ARE HARDLY IN A POSITION TO JUDGE PRECISELY

WHAT THEY WOULD COST. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS TO BE MAJOR PROGRESS IN THE INTERDICTION OF NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, MUCH MORE MONEY MUST BE SPENT THAN IS PRESENTLY AVAILABLE OR CONTEMPLATED.

3. PRODUCTION -SOUTHEAST ASIA IS PROBABLY PRODUCING AROUND 500 METRIC TONS OF OPIUM ANNUALLY. IF THIS PRODUCTION CAN BE REDUCED OR APPRECIABLY SHRUNKEN, OUR EFFORTS AT EVERY POINT WILL BE FACILITATED.

4. AS THE BULK OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPIUM IS PRODUCED IN BURMA (PROBABLY 80 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, OR ABOUT 400 METRIC TONS), THE MAJOR EFFORT AT HALTING OR REDUCING PRODUCTION MUST BE IN THAT COUNTRY. IT IS A SIMPLE FACT THAT THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCING AREA FOR OPIUM POPPIES IS IN THE SHAN STATE IN EASTERN BURMA, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN UNDER CONTROL OF THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT IN ANY MAJOR WAY SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1948. MOREOVER, THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT, WITH THE MILITARY POWER AVAILABLE TO IT, IS UNLIKELY EVER TO ASSERT CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THIS AREA. IN THIS CONTEXT IT IS THEREFORE MEANINGLESS WHETHER THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC OR NOT. THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT CANNOT PREVENT THIS APALANCHE OF OPIUM FROM FINDING ITS WAY INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET.

5. THERE SEEMS TO BE ONLY ONE WAY OF HOLDING DOWN PRODUCTION OF OPIUM IN BURMA, IN MY VIEW, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THAT IS IN A MASSIVE PROGRAM OF DEFOLIATION OF

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THE OPIUM FIELDS IN THE SHAN STATE. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE APPARENTLY ENCOURAGING EFFORTS BEING DEPLOYED IN MEXICO IN DEFOLIATING OPIUM POPPY FIELDS IN NORTHERN MEXICO, AS A MEANS OF SHRINKING THE PRODUCTION OF OPIUM AND, EVENTUALLY, OF HEROIN AS WELL. THE TECHNOLOGY IS KNOWN, THE HERBICIDES ARE AVAILABLE, AND I ASSUME THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER SUCH A PROGRAM. I BELIEVE THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION.

6. FOR THE PRODUCING FIELDS IN THAILAND, I BELIEVE THAT TWO COURSES OF ACTION ARE THE MOST PROMISING FOR SUCCESS. I BELIEVE THAT A DEFOLIATION CAMPAIGN SHOULD BE AT LEAST PLANNED FOR NORTHERN THAILAND, WHERE THE OPIUM POPPIES ARE PRESENTLY GROWN. ALLIED TO SUCH A PLAN SHOULD BE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO EXTEND AND POPULARIZE THE EFFECTIVE WORK IN CROP RESEARCH WHICH THE UN PROGRAM FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL HAS CARRIED ON FOR THE PAST FOUR YEARS. BY NOW A SERIES OF CROPS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND TESTED IN NORTHERN THAI-

LAND AND FOUND PROMISING AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF INCOME FOR THE OPIUM POPPY GROWERS.

7. HOWEVER, AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A SUCCESSFUL CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM IN NORTHERN THAILAND MUST BE A PROGRAM FOR FINANCING AND MARKETING SUCH SUBSTITUTE CROPS. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED REPEATEDLY BY S/NM THAT NO RPT NO U.S. FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR SUCH A PURPOSE, AS EXPENDITURE OF SUCH FUNDS MUST BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO CCINC ENFORCEMENT GOALS. I SUBMIT THAT THIS JUDGMENT MUST BE RECONSIDERED IF WE ARE SERIOUS IN OUR EFFORTS TO SHRINK PRODUCTION OF OPIUM. I FEEL SURE THAT, IF A VIABLE REVOLVING FUND FOR FINANCING THE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF SUBSTITUTE CROPS CAN BE SET UP, WE CAN OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF THE RTG IN SETTING A MASSIVE CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM IN MOTION. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT OTHER NARCOTICS "VICTIM" COUNTRIES (SUCH AS THE U.K. THE NETHERLANDS, FRANCE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

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GERMANY, PERHAPS JAPAN) WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR FINANCING PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSTITUTE CROPS.

8. AERIAL SURVEY - TO CARRY OUT A MASSIVE DEFOLIATION PROGRAM IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE AREA, IT WILL, OF COURSE, BE NECESSARY TO HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHERE THE OPIUM POPPIES ARE GROWING. I NOTE, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT A U.S. GOVERNMENT GEOGRAPHER, MR. GARY GULLETT, WILL BE VISITING THAILAND IN LATE APRIL AND MAY, LOOKING AT A VARIETY OF POSSIBILITIES FOR IDENTIFYING OPIUM POPPIES UNDER CULTIVATION. ULTIMATELY, AN AERIAL SURVEY OF THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE MAY SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFY THE GROWING AREAS FOR SUBSEQUENT DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS. A SIMILAR PROPOSAL WAS CONSIDERED IN 1971 OR 1972 BUT WAS NOT PURSUED BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION WITHIN THE THAI GOVERNMENT, FOR ALLEGED NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. THE ATTITUDE OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERABLY CHANGED SINCE THAT TIME, AND I BELIEVE THAT A NEW APPROACH MIGHT MEET WITH MORE SUCCESS. OBVIOUSLY, THE AERIAL SURVEY, TO BE MEANINGFUL, WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN BURMA, WHERE MOST OF THE OPIUM IS PRODUCED. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ESTIMATE HOW THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT REGARD SUCH A PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT, AS THE OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE IS TO DESTROY AS MUCH OF THE OPIUM CROP AS POSSIBLE-- A PURPOSE WHICH THE BURMESE ARMY HAS BEEN PURSUING WITH CONSIDERABLE DETERMINATION BUT ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS TO DATE AND WHICH, ACCORDING TO RANGOON 0544 (REF B) IT MAY NOT WISH TO CONTINUE.

9. SUPPRESSION- THE OPIUM PRODUCING AREAS OF NORTHERN

THAILAND AND EASTERN BURMA ADJOIN EACH OTHER, AND IT IS
IN THE BORDER AREA OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES THAT ARE LO-
CATED THE REFINERIES FOR CONVERSION OF OPIUM INTO MORPHINE
AND ULTIMATELY INTO HEROIN.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0440

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10. THERE IS A LONG HISTORY OF MISTRUST AND SUSPICION THAT LIES
BEHIND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THAILAND AND BURMA. HOWEVER,
EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION OF NARCOTICS FROM THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE
WILL DEPEND ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE
BURMESE CLAIM THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT IS INSINCERE AND THAT IT
IS INFILTRATED BY PEOPLE COOPERATING WITH OR IN THE PAY OF
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS. THERE MAY BE SOME TRUTH
IN THIS, BUT IF WE SIMPLY ACCEPT THIS VIEW AS RULING OUT
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THERE WILL NEVER BE
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. THE FACT THAT THE
THAI PUSHED CHENG CHI FU AND THE SHAN UNITED ARMY OUT OF
THAILAND IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR IS A GOOD SIGN.

11. A BURMESE OPERATION AIMED AT REFINERIES IN THE BORDER AREA
IN JANUARY, 1977, WAS LARGELY A FAILURE, PARTLY OWING TO THE
FACT THE BURMESE ARMY WOULD GIVE NO ADVANCE NOTICE TO THE THAI
AUTHORITIES. THAI FORCES WERE THEREFORE NOT IN A POSITION TO
BLOCK NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS FLEEING AHEAD OF THE BURMESE ARMY.
IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THIS OPERATION THE BURMESE FORCES WERE
INFILTRATED BY AGENTS OF THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS (BURMESE ARMY
HIRED LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN PORTERS TO CARRY THEIR
EQUIPMENT, SOME OF WHOM DISAPPEARED SHORTLY BEFORE CONTACT WITH
THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, PRESUMABLY TO WARN THEIR EMPLOYERS).
BURMESE ARMY ALSO QUESTIONS THE LOYALTY OF THE GUIDES FURNISHED
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BY US.

12. I BELIEVE THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE BURMESE AUTHORITIES IN A JOINT OPERATION ALONG THE BORDER, WHICH WOULD AT LEAST HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF DISRUPTING THE NARCOTICS REFINERIES IN CERTAIN AREAS. EVEN IF NO RPT NO NARCOTICS WERE SEIZED, LARGE-SCALE DISRUPTION OF REFINERIES WOULD HAVE AT LEAST A DISCOURAGING IMPACT ON THE TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS. WE WILL NEVER FIND OUT IF SUCH AN EFFORT IS FEASIBLE UNLESS IT IS TRIED. THE DEPARTMENT MAY RECALL THE VISIT OF THAI FOREIGN MINISTER UPPADIT TO RANGOON IN JANUARY, 1977, IN WHICH HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER, GENERAL KRIANGSAK, AND THE DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER, GENERAL LEK. THE THAI UNDERLINED THEIR WISH TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH BURMA BY SENDING SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION. IF THEY COULD MEET WITH AN EQUIVALENT RESPONSE FROM THE BURMESE, THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR USEFUL COOPERATION IN JOINT ANTI-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS.

13. (COMMENT: IN CONNECTION WITH SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS, YOU WILL NOTE THAT I AM NOT RPT NOT RECOMMENDING THE PROVISION OF WHAT AID CALLS "COMMODITIES"--I.E., MORE HELICOPTERS, VEHICLES, AND OTHER EQUIPMENT--AT THIS TIME. IT IS EASY TO SPEND ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY ON SUCH THINGS. HOWEVER, IN MY VIEW BOTH THE BURMESE AND THE THAI HAVE ENOUGH EQUIPMENT ON HAND WHICH, IF USED PROPERLY AND IN COOPERATION WITH EACH OTHER, WILL BRING MUCH IMPROVED RESULTS. IF THE BURMESE AND THE THAI SUCCESSFULLY UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF JOINT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN THE BORDER AREA, IT WILL BE APPROPRIATE AT A LATER DATE TO EXAMINE WHETHER FURTHER EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY. END COMMENT)

14. REWARDS - CLOSELY RELATED TO SUPPRESSION ACTIVITIES, THOUGH MORE IN TERMS OF EFFORTS IN THE MAJOR PORTS AND POPULATION CENTERS SUCH AS BANGKOK, IS THE QUESTION OF REWARDS FOR TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. IN
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OCTOBER, 1976, THE RTG REVISED ITS NARCOTICS REWARD REGULATIONS. IN THE VIEW OF THE U.S. CUSTOMS ADVISERS WORKING WITH THE THAI CUSTOMS, THE PRESENT AWARDS ARE QUITE ADEQUATE. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IS THAT, UNDER THE THAI SYSTEM, THE REWARDS ARE NOT RPT NOT PAID IMMEDIATELY ON THE ARREST OF THE TRAFFICKERS AND SEIZURES OF THE NARCOTICS BUT ONLY AFTER THE TRIALS AND SENTENCING HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THIS MEANS THAT THERE ARE DELAYS OF A YEAR OR LONGER BETWEEN THE ARREST OF A TRAFFICKER AND THE PAYMENT

OF THE REWARD. I LAST RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH THE THAI THREE DAYS AGO BUT DOUBT THAT THEY WILL GET THEIR REGULATIONS CHANGED UNTIL THEIR NEW NARCOTICS ORGANIZATION GETS FULLY UNDERWAY.

15. TO ENCOURAGE IMPROVED PERFORMANCE BY THAI POLICE AND CUSTOMS OFFICIALS, DEA/BANGKOK HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PAY SELECTIVE REWARDS TO THAI PERSONNEL. THIS IS AN UNUSUAL ARRANGEMENT, TO SAY THE LEAST, AND MANY COUNTRIES WOULD BE QUITE UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT HAVING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PAY LOCAL OFFICIALS FOR DOING THEIR JOB. THE FACT IS THAT THE THAI THINK IT IS GREAT, BUT DEA, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HEADQUARTERS, HAS UNDERSTANDABLY BUT UNFORTUNATELY REVISED ITS REWARDS PROGRAM BY LIMITING REWARDS TO CASES OF DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT. SENIOR THAI POLICE OFFICIALS, SUCH AS GEN. PHAO SARASIN, HAVE BEEN MOST UNHAPPY ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF THE DEA REWARDS PROGRAM, CLEARLY PREFERING TO CONTINUE WITH IT. I BELIEVE THAT AN EXPANDED REWARDS SYSTEM COULD BE DEVELOPED IN THAILAND BY AUTHORIZING THE DEA REGIONAL DIRECTOR IN BANGKOK, AT HIS DISCRETION, TO PAY THE EXISTING THAI REWARD SCHEDULE, WHICH WOULD MEET WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE THAI POLICE OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAM.

16. FOR THE U.S., THE REAL ISSUE, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS WHETHER IT IS WORTH SPENDING MONEY ON REWARDS TO ENCOURAGE IMPROVED PERFORMANCE BY THAI POLICE AND CUSTOMS OFFICIALS. IN MY VIEW, A CAREFULLY-ADMINISTERED PROGRAM IS CERTAINLY WORTH THE EFFORT AND COULD BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO CCINC ENFORCEMENT GOALS IN THE MOST LITERAL SENSE OF THE WORD.

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17. IT IS EVEN CONCEIVABLE THAT WE COULD WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH NARCOTICS SEIZED IN SITUATIONS WHERE WE HAVE PAID REWARDS TO A THAI OFFICIAL COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE U.S. FOR DISPOSITION (EITHER BY DESTRUCTION OR BY SALE FOR USE IN LEGITIMATE PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS). ANY PROCEEDS FROM SUCH SALES MIGHT BE TURNED OVER TO THE UN FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL TO EXPAND ITS EFFORTS ACROSS THE BOARD IN THE ANTI-NARCOTICS FIELD.

18. LAOS - I HAVE MADE NO PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO LAOS. OBVIOUSLY, WITH AN OPIUM PRODUCTION PROBABLY OF ABOUT THE SAME MAGNITUDE AS THAILAND'S, LAOS IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE AREA. AT THIS POINT I WOULD JUDGE THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH LAOS ARE SIMPLY TOO LIMITED TO SUPPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO ELICIT LAO COOPERATION IN THE NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION EFFORT. PERHAPS THE MOST WE CAN DO NOW IS TO HOPE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL, FOR THEIR OWN REASONS, FIND IT DESIRABLE TO DISCOURAGE THE PRODUCTION OF OPIUM WITHIN THE COUNTRY OR WILL ARRANGE TO CHANNEL LAO PRODUCTION INTO LEGITIMATE PHARMACEUTICALS PROCESSED IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

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19. CONCLUSION - IN DEVELOPING THE FOREGOING PROPOSALS, I HAVE PROCEEDED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE WILL GET MORE COOPERATION OUT OF THE THAI BY WORKING WITH THEM THAN BY BEATING THEM ABOUT THE HEAD AND SHOULDERS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY ARE FEELING RATHER SMUG OVER THE IMMENSE IMPROVEMENT OF 1976 OVER 1975. IT IS EASY TO BE DISSATISFIED WITH THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. MORE CAN, SHOULD, AND MUST BE DONE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE MUST CONSIDER WHAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WE CAN BRING TO BEAR ON THIS PROBLEM, IN THE AREAS I HAVE INDICATED.

20. ABOUT A YEAR AGO AN INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TEAM, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GEORGE ROBERTS, THEN CUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR THAILAND-BURMA AFFAIRS, VISITED BANGKOK TO REVIEW THE NARCOTICS PROGRAM. PART OF THE PATTERN OF THEIR CONVERSATION TO THAILAND MIGHT BE CUT OFF IF THE THAI DID NOT IMPROVE THEIR PERFORMANCE IN INTERDICTING THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS TO WORLD MARKETS, INCLUDING THE US. THIS PROPOSAL HAS BE MADE PREVIOUSLY, AS WELL. HOWEVER, AS THE DEPARTMENT IS WELL AWARE, OUR ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM IS IN ITS FINAL YEARS, IS SMALL IN SIZE, AND WILL PROBABLY BE COMPLETELY LIQUIDATED IN 1980-81, IF NOT SOONER, OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND IS ALSO IN ITS FINAL PHASE, WITH GRANT MAP DUE TO END WITH FY1978 AND WITH AN UNCERTAIN
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FUTURE HANGING OVER EVEN FMS SALES. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE IS MUCH LEVERAGE IN ENDING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID A YEAR OR TWO EARLIER THAN NOW SEEMS LIKELY.

21. BY THE SAME TOKEN, I WOULD BE FAILING IN MY DUTY IF I DID NOT POINT OUT THAT CUTTING OFF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THAILAND AS A SANCTION FOR WHAT SOME SEEM TO JUDGE AS UNSATISFACTORY THAI PERFORMANCE IS A DANGEROUS WEAPON TO USE. IN ADDITION TO THE PROFOUNDLY DESTABILIZING EFFECT SUCH A MOVE MIGHT HAVE THROUGHTOUT THIS REGION, - LIKELY THAI RESPONSE MIGHT BE A REQUEST TO THE U S TO REMOVE THE DEA REGIONAL OFFICE HERE AND PERHAPS A CURTAILMENT IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SOME OF THE SUCCESSES WE HAVE REGISTERED. WHERE WOULD THIS LEAVE THE U S NATINAL INTEREST? VERY POORLY SERVED, IN MY VIEW.

22. IN SUM, I BELIEVE THAT THE THAI HAVE DONE MUCH MORE THAN SOME WASHINGTON OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO CREDIT THEM WITH. IN TERMS OF SEIZURES, BOTH IN THAILAND AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE, WITH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED IN THAILAND, I THINK THE THAI RECORD WILL STAND UP AGAINST COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. THE PRESENT THAI GOVERNMENT APPEARS PREPARED TO WORK MORE DILIGENTLY TO CONTROL THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC THAN WAS THE CASE WITH PREVIOUS THAI GOVERNMENTS. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD WORK WITH THE THAI AUTHORITIES, IN PURSUIT OF OUR COMMON GOALS, AND SERIOUSLY EXPLORE THE PROPOSALS IN THIS MESSAGE.

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